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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the district court.
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.

The Utah Court

The Utah Supreme Court

has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3; Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-2-2(3)(i), 78-2a-3 (1953).
Appeals.

This matter is transferable to the Utah Court of

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1987).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in allowing Fairway Distributing Company and

Fairway, Ltd. ("Fairway") to amend the complaint to state a strict liability claim?
2.

The Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 402A, as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court

in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), imposes strict
products liability upon "sellers."

Did the district court err in entering judgment

against Diehl Lumber Company ("Diehl") in spite of the jury's finding that Diehl was
not a seller?
3.

Did the district court err in instructing the jury, over Diehl's objection,

that a "broker" could be held strictly liable for defects in products "brokered?"
4.

Is the jury's finding that Diehl "brokered" the trusses supported by

substantial admissible evidence?
5.

Did the district court err in giving the following instruction over Diehl's

objection:
The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as
well as all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable
for damages caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long
as that party is in the business of, and gains profit from, distributing
or otherwise disposing of the "product" in question through the stream of

-1-

commerce. The primary justification for extending strict liability to all
in the chain of distribution is to provide the "maximum" protection to the
consumer. This policy is as applicable to those who never handle or
control the product, as it is to those who do possess or control the
product. In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor
considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of the product is
not a prerequisite for the imposition of strict liability.
6.

Did the district court err in allowing Fairway to introduce evidence of

Diehlfs wealth?
7.

Did the court err in allowing Fairway to introduce evidence to support an

unpled theory of "successor liability," or in refusing to give a corrective
instruction?
8

Did the district court err in dismissing Diehl's crossclaim against

Truswall Systems, Inc. ("Truswal")?
9.

Is the jury's finding that Truswal was not at fault supported by

substantial admissible evidence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves the collapse of a warehouse roof.
constructed by John Mark Bangerter ("Bangerter") in 1979.

The building was
(Reporters transcript

^ h e reporter's transcript is a little confusing. The Reporter has transcribed the
proceedings of pre-trial hearings in separate volumes which are non consecutively
paginated. The trial poceedings are transcribed in the volumes which are
consecutively paginated. Pre-trial proceedings will be referred to by date and
page, for example; (Tr., June 1, 1987, 10). Trial proceedings will be referred to
by page alone, for example: (Tr. 318). Documents listed on the records index will
be referred to by page number, for example: (R. 1370).
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414).

The building was sold in 1982 to Fairway-

portion of the roof collapsed.

(Tr. 70) On January 24, 1984, a

(Tr. 67)

The trusses in question were sold by Colonial Lumber, Inc. ("Colonial") to
Bangerter.

(Tr. 118-123; Plaintiffs' Ex. 6, R. 1570, attached as Appen. A ) .

Colonial did not manufacture trusses.

In 1979, when Colonial had a customer who

wanted trusses, Colonial*s sales people called several truss makers, including Truss
Teck, for competitive bids. The lowest price received from a truss maker would be
marked up. The marked up price would be quoted to Colonial's customer.

If the

customer agreed to the price, Colonial would obtain engineering drawings from the
truss maker, and forward them to Colonial's customer.

After Colonial's customer

approved the engineering drawings, the trusses were made.
frequently picked up and delivered by Colonial.

The trusses were

(Tr. 115-117, 154-157, 434,

441-442).
If Truss Teck was the truss maker selected by Colonial, Colonial would later
receive an invoice from Diehl.

(Tr. 157-158).

Receiving the invoice from Diehl was

the only contact Colonial had with Diehl regarding the trusses.

(Tr. 158).

In 1979, Truss Teck was a fledgling company that made trusses.
294-295).

(Tr. 291-292,

Truss Teck had its own sales staff, consisting of several people. (Tr.

300).
Truss Teck's customers would call and describe the trusses needed. The
dimensions would be conveyed to Truswal. Truss Teck would receive a design drawing
from Truswal detailing the type and amount of lumber and size and number of plates.
This design was used to bid the price on the trusses. A work order was then filled
out by Truss Teck showing the type of truss, the price, and a quote number.
152-153, 159, 305-309; Defendant's Ex. 1, R. 1570, attached as Appen. B).
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(Tr.

Often an engineering drawing was sent to the customer for approval.

If the

price and engineering were approved by the customer, the trusses were made.

The

trusses were either picked up by the customer, shipped by Truss Teck or shipped by
Diehl.

Since Truss Teck did not have a computer or accounting staff, a copy of the

work order would be sent to Diehl.

Diehl would in turn generate an invoice and

collect Truss Teck's accounts receivables.

Diehl did not mark up the price to Truss

Teck's customer, but rather, kept a small percentage of the receivable, when
collected, for the accounting service.

(Tr. 302-312, 318-320, 325-328).

Shortly

after 1979, Truss Teck purchased a computer and began doing its own billing.

(Tr.

325).
In 1979, Diehl did not manufacture trusses.
selling trusses.

Diehl did not get involved in

Diehl did not actively negotiate the sale of trusses between

buyers and sellers.

Diehl was simply a billing agent for Truss Teck.

(Tr. 328-329,

334-353).
The paper trail concerning the trusses involved in this case begins with a work
order from Truss Teck.

(Tr. 152-153, 159, 305-309; Defendants' Ex. 1, R. 1570,

attached as Appen. B). The work order references Bangerter and describes Colonial
as Truss Teck's customer.
"Herb."

The work order indicates the trusses were ordered by

Herb was a salesman for Colonial and one of three people at Colonial who

frequently ordered trusses for Colonial.
the trusses in question.

(Tr. 153, 172). The work order describes

Under the heading "ship via," the work order states:

"w/c

7-23-79" which means "will call," indicating the trusses were to be picked up from
Truss Teck by Colonial or Bangerter on July 23, 1979.

(Tr. 155, 309).

The next document in the paper trail is an invoice from Diehl to Colonial, dated
July 31, 1979.

(Tr. 134-138; Plaintiffs Ex. 11, R. 1570, attached as Appen. C).
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The invoice was not created until after the trusses had been ordered, made and
picked up.

(Tr. 168). The invoice references John Mark Bangerter and the Truss

Teck work order number, 3176. The price on the Diehl invoice is exactly the same as
the price stated on the Truss Teck work order.
The next document in the paper trail is an invoice from Colonial to Bangerter.
(Tr. 121-23; Plaintiffs' Ex. 6, R. 1570, attached as Appendix A).

Colonial did mark

up the price, reflecting the fact that Colonial had purchased and resold the trusses.
Truss Teck was a corporation separate and distinct from Diehl.
founded by Gary Diehl in 1978.

Truss Teck was

(Tr. 295). No Diehl officers or shareholders were

involved in Truss Teck and no Truss Teck officers or shareholders were involved in
Diehl.

Diehl did not own stock in Truss Teck.

Diehl.

(Tr. 316).

Truss Teck did not own stock in

Until 1982, Truss Teck did business at 8169 South State, Midvale, Utah.

Diehl

was located approximately at 1700 South 700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

In 1982,

Truss Teck moved to 1840 South 700 West and rented property from Diehl.

(Tr. 296).

Later in 1982, Diehl purchased some truss manufacturing equipment from Truss
Teck.

Truss Teck did not sell its office equipment, good will, accounts

receivables, inventory or customer list.

These were sold to others to pay Truss

Teckfs creditors. Diehl did not assume any liabilities of Truss Teck.
not use the Truss Teck name.

Diehl did

(Tr. 300, 313-317).

After purchasing some manufacturing equipment from Truss Teck in 1982, Diehl
made trusses for a few years. Some of Truss Teck's employees were hired by Diehl.
However, the officers and directors of Truss Teck did not become officers or
directors of Diehl.

(Tr. 315-317).
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Truss Teck was dissolved in 1984.

(Tr. 318; Defendants' Ex. 2, R. 1570).

Fairway claims that the trusses had three defects.
trusses were undersized.

First, the plates on the

Second, the plates were misplaced during manufacture.

Third, the designer failed to consider additional strains which occurred at the
"heel joint.1'

(Tr. 254-267, 280-288).

It is customary for truss makers to be associated with a plate manufacturing and
engineering firm.

Ordinarily, the truss maker purchases and stocks various sized

plates from one particular plate manufacturer.

Then, as trusses are manufactured

for different applications, the plate manufacturer provides engineering services
free of charge, so long as that manufacturer's plates are used.

(Tr. 212-215, 220,

278-279, 312-314, 394-396, 408-412).
The plates used on the trusses in this particular building carry the Truswal
logo.

(Tr. 214). During 1979, Truss Teck used exclusively Truswal plates.

In

return for purchasing the plates, Truss Teck was entitled to receive engineering
designs from Truswal free of charge.

Truss Teck never attempted to design its own

trusses, nor did it deviate from Truswal's designs. (Tr. 303-304, 308, 312-314).
Despite the undisputed evidence that:
engineering flaw;

1) the trusses were defective because of an

2) the plates were provided by Truswal; and 3) that it would have

been very unusual and contrary to customary industry practices for Truswal plates to
have been used without a Truswal design, the jury found that Truswal was not at
fault for the collapse.

(R. 1376, attached as Appen. D).

The original complaint stated two claims against Diehl.

The Second Claim for

Relief alleged that Diehl impliedly warranted the trusses as merchantable and fit
for a particular purpose.

The Third Claim for Relief alleged that Diehl negligently

-6-

breached its duty to properly advise the contractors as to the proper means and
methods of installing, connecting and bracing the trusses.
complaint contained claims against other defendants.
In July, 1985, Fairway moved for leave to amend.

The remainder of the

(R. 2-9).
(R. 163-166).

The proposed

amended complaint contained an additional strict liability claim and added
additional defendants.

(R. 167-177).

On August 23, 1985, the district court entered an order requiring plaintiffs to
file a verified factual statement about each party to be added, stating the
evidence that justified adding each new party.

The order granted Fairway 15 days

to file the required statement, after which the court would rule on the motion to
amend.

(The order is not part of the record.

But see, R. 753-755).

Fairway

failed to file any verified statement and did not make any objection to the order
as it related to the proposed strict liability claim.

On September 11, 1985, the

court entered another order denying Fairway's motion to amend.
part of the record.

(The order is not

But see, R. 753-755).

On February 10, 1987, at a pretrial conference, the court set a trial date of
July 29, 1987.
time.

Nothing was said by Fairway regarding the strict liability at that

(R. 302, 305-307).

On June 1, 1987 another pretrial conference was held.

Again, nothing was said

by Fairway about a claim for strict liability at that time.

(Tr., June 1, 1987,

1-40).
On June 16, 1987 Fairway filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion entitled "Motion to
Correct Court Order or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint to Include a Cause of
Action Based on Strict Liability."

(The motion is not part of the record.
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But

see, Tr. , June 23, 1987, 31-45).

Diehl objected to Fairway's motion to correct

the order on the following grounds:
1.

The motion was not brought within three months after entry of the order

that Fairway asked be corrected, or within a reasonable time as required by
U. R. Civ, P. 60(b).
2.

Fairway had not met its burden of showing excusable neglect or other

justification for modifying the court's earlier order, as required by U. R. Civ. P.
60(b).
3.

Diehl would be prejudiced by the late introduction of a new claim which

Diehl was not prepared to defend.
4.

If Fairway's strict liability claim had been raised earlier, Diehl would

have been able to raise an indemnification claim against Truss Teck.

As of June,

1987, Diehl's indemnification claims against Truss Teck were barred by Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-12-25.5, 16-10-100 (1953).

(Tr., June 23, 1987, 3-45; R. 738-748).

On July 9, 1987 the court granted Fairway leave to amend and postponed trial
until October 28, 1987.

(R. 753-755).

At the final pretrial conference, Fairway voluntarily dropped its claims of
negligence and breach of warranty, admitting there was no evidence to support those
claims.

(Tr., October 13, 1987, 21). Counsel for Fairway represented that Truswal

had settled Fairway's claims against Truswal.

(Tr., October 13, 1987, 22, 24-27).

On October 27, 1987 Truswal filed and argued a motion to enforce a settlement
between Fairway and Truswal.

Truswal alleged that Fairway had agreed to execute a

release which would cut off crossclaims against Truswal by reducing any judgment
against the remaining defendants by the greater of the amount paid by Truswal or
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the percentage of Truswal*s fault, as provided by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-42,
78-21-43 (1953) (repealed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 et. seg.) (1987)).

The

court dismissed Truswal but did not resolve the issue of whether or not Truswal*s
fault would go to the jury, or whether remaining defendants would be given credit
for the greater of the amount Truswal paid in settlement or Truswal's share of
negligence.

(Tr., October 27, 1987, 15-38).

On October 28th, 29th, and 30th, 1987, Fairway's strict liability claim against
defendants Colonial Lumber Company and Diehl was tried to a jury.
Over Diehl's objection (Tr. 451) the case was tried to the jury on the theory
that a "broker" could be held strictly liable for defects in a product "brokered."
The court defined a broker as follows:
Definition of broker: An agent employed to make bargains and contracts
for a compensation. A middleman or negotiator between parties. A person
whose business it is to bring buyer and seller together. Buyers and
sellers of goods and negotiators between buyers and sellers, but without
having custody of the property.
(Instruction No. 21, R. 1359; Tr. 456).
Also over Diehl's objection, Fairway was allowed to introduce evidence of
Diehlfs wealth.

(Tr. 330-331).

The trial court refused to give an instruction to

minimize the prejudice caused by such evidence.

(Tr. 453).

Before trial, Diehl received Fairway's proposed jury instructions, which
included proposed instructions on a new "successor liability" theory of recovery.
Fairway claimed for the first time that Diehl was liable for the debts of Truss
Teck, because Diehl purchased some assets from Truss Teck in 1982, several years
after these trusses were made.

On October 28, Diehl filed a written objection to

Fairway trying the case on the new successor liability claim.
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(R. 1198-1204).

Diehl objected because this claim had not been raised in the pleadings or the
pretrial order.

Over Diehl's objections, Fairway was allowed to introduce evidence

which Fairway claimed supported the new claim, including the wealth of Truss Teck
and Diehl, and the personal relationship between some of the shareholders of the two
corporations.

(Tr. 292-302).

At the close of plaintiff's case, Diehl moved for directed verdict.

That motion

was granted as to the "successor liability" claim, but denied as to the strict
liability claim.

(Tr., 363-368).

The trial court refused to given an instruction

which would have resolved some of the confusion caused by some of the "successor
liability" evidence.

(Tr. 453).

The jury returned answers to special interrogatories, finding that Diehl did not
sell the trusses in question, but

had "brokered" the trusses in question.

(R.

1375-1377, attached as Appen. D).
On February 4, 1988, the court entered final judgment against Diehl for the
entire amount of the damages found by the jury less the amount that Truswal had paid
in settlement, together with prejudgment interest.

(R. 1566-1570, attached as

Appen. E).
Diehl requests that the judgment be reversed, and that Fairway's claims against
Diehl be dismissed with prejudice.

In the alternative, the judgment against Diehl

should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING ITS EARLIER ORDER AND
ALLOWING FAIRWAY TO AMEND.
A.

U. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Required Plaintiffs to Show Excusable Neglect and
Bring the Motion Within Three Months After the Court's Original Order
Denying Leave to Amend.

Fairway claims the trial court erred in 1985 when the court denied Fairway's
motion to amend.
practice.

It was not error for the court to refuse to adopt Fairway's sloppy

If there was error it was Fairway's, alone.

The primary focus of the proposed Amended Complaint was the addition of new
parties.

By Fairway's own admission, when Fairway was challenged on whether they

had sufficient evidence to add new parties, Fairway simply decided to let the matter
drop by not responding to the court's directive to file verified statements.
June 23, 1987, 32-33).

(Tr.,

The trial court rightfully concluded that Fairway was not

interested.
At that point in time, the amended complaint as proposed was not proper, without
substantial modification.

Fairway could and should have redrafted the proposed

amended complaint, dropping the reference to the proposed new parties.

Fairway

could and should have filed a new motion to file an amended complaint which was
consistent with the court's ruling and which also contained the strict liability
claim.

The error was Fairway's sloppy practice, not the court's insistence on

proper procedure.
Fairway characterized their motion as one brought under 60(b) U. R. Civ. P.,
which states:
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On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) When, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action;
(5) The judgment is void;
(6) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or
(7) Any other reason justifying relief
judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or

from the operation of the
reasonable time and for
three months after the
taken. . . .

Even assuming there was some error other than Fairway's, Rule 60(b) does not
allow the court discretion to waive the three month requirement.

Nor can the court

avoid the three month limitation by resorting to subparagraph 7 when the ground
asserted for relief falls with subparagraph 1.
1193, 1195 (Utah 1984).

E.g., Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d

Even if the district court were free to manipulate the rule

in such a fashion, a motion made pursuant

to subparagraph 7 must still be made

within a reasonable time. Fairway waited nearly two years to correct the asserted
"error." Two years is not even arguably reasonable.
Rule 60(b) serves the same strong policies that support the "law of the case"
doctrine.
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[I]n the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is
desirable to avoid the delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious
contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in the same case.
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977).

Obviously this

policy is not so strong as to preclude all modifications of existing orders. But,
it is strong enough to require that a motion to modify an existing order be made
timely.
Nor did plaintiffs bear their burden of showing excusable neglect.

There is no

question that there was neglect:
Mr. Baker: The Court later on, because we didn't file those factual
statements relative to parties, the Motion to Amend is denied. Now,
somehow that slipped between the cracks and I did not focus on the facts
that the total motion, according to this document, had been [denied]. I
had just sort of assumed in my mind that the motion relative to the strict
liability had been granted and was in the case. So, it was only when I
was going back recently to find out and to check the pleadings that I
caught that error.
(Tr., June 23, 1987, 33).
I made a mistake in not catching it . . . .
Id.
Your Honor, I agree I made a mistake.
Court's attention . . . .

I should have brought that to the

(Tr., June 23, 1987, 43).
I was wrong, too. I should have caught it.
not catching it . . . .

I certainly was negligent in

(Tr., June 23, 1987, 44). But, Rule 60(b) requires a showing of excusable neglect,
not just neglect.
At the hearing Fairway took the position that while its motion cited Rule 60(b),
that was a typographical error.

They really intended to rely upon Rule 60(a).
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Rule

60(a), however, cannot be used to avert rule 60(b) if it was not a clerical error.
E.g., Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984).
In that case, Lindsay sued Atkin and Nyberg on a promissory note executed by
them listing Southern Utah Hay Company as promissor.

Parrish Oil Tools was brought

into the action upon Lindsay's motion to include all parties with an interest.
Later, the parties determined that Parrish was a limited partner of Southern Utah
Hay.

At pretrial, Lindsay's attorney invited Parrish to submit an order of

dismissal, since, as a limited partner, they were not a proper party.
submitted an order of dismissal with prejudice which was signed.

Parrish

Atkin and Nyberg

were found liable. After satisfying the judgment they sued Parrish for
contribution.

Parrish raised the dismissal with prejudice as a defense.

Atkin and

Nyberg moved, pursuant to Rule 60(a), to modify the order to one dismissing without
prejudice.

That motion was denied and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, stating:

This Court has differentiated between clerical errors and judicial errors,
stating:
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does
not depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was
made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as
rendered. 46 Am.Jr.2d Judgments § 202.
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970)
(emphasis added). The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court
and parties. 6A Moore's Federal Practice § 60.06[1] (2d ed. 1983). Rule
60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a substantial nature,
particularly where the claim of error is unilateral. The fact that an
intention was subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the
mistake to be "clerical." See Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333 (7th
Cir. 1972).
In the instant case, the error complained of may not be characterized
as "clerical." The court may have erred in granting Parrish Oil Tools a
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dismissal with prejudice, but the appropriate remedy was a timely motion
to amend and/or a timely appeal to this Court.
Id. at 402.
In this case there is no indication, whatever, that the court intended to do
anything other than that which it did in 1985.

The court may not have even been

conscious of the fact that the proposed amended complaint contained an additional
claim against existing parties.

It is not the job of a busy trial court to

carefully compare the original complaint and amended complaint.

The court dealt

with the objections raised and denied the motion to amend in toto.

The fact that

intent was subsequently found to be mistaken, if it was, does not cause the mistake
to be "clerical."

If the court erred in 1985, the appropriate remedy was for

Fairway to draft a new proposed amendment without the additional parties and bring a
new motion to amend, or for Fairway to bring a timely Rule 60(b) motion.
What is meant by the term "clerical error" is best illustrated by the case of
Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956).

In that case the judge signed

an order prepared by counsel without reading it carefully.
comported his earlier written and oral rulings.

The court assumed it

The order had not been circulated

to counsel and was inconsistent with an earlier Supreme Court decision in the same
matter.
It is true that U. R. Civ. P. 15 gives the trial court discretion to grant leave
to amend.

However, the general provisions of Rule 15 should give to the more

specific dictates of Rule 60 where the matter has previously been ruled upon.
15 should not be used to avert Rule 60.
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Rule

B.

Diehl Was Prejudiced by the Untimely Amendment.

The trial court cannot ignore Rule 60 and rely upon Rule 15. But, even if it
could, before the district court can grant leave to amend under Rule 15, it must
consider whether the opposing side will be prejudiced:
A primary consideration that a trial judge must take into account in
determining whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing side
would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for
which he had not had time to prepare.
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld as proper the refusal of trial
courts to allow new claims when the plaintiff has given some indication that a
theory will not be relied upon, or the plaintiff knew of the basis for a new claim
for some time before moving to amend.

E.g., Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365

(Utah 1984); Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983); Girard v.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
Diehl has a constitutional right to fair notice of the nature and basis of
claims against it.

Diehl also has a right to a reasonable opportunity to prepare

and be heard on those claims.
Notice and an opportunity to be heard are elementary reguirements of due
process of law when the rights of a party are to be affected by judicial
proceeding.
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612, 612 (1929).
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities and
liberalize procedure, we must not lose sight of the cardinal principal
that under our system of justice, if an issue is to be tried and the
party's right concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof
and an opportunity to meet it.
National Farmer's Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d
249, 253 (1955).

See also, U.S. Const. Amend. V, cl.3; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
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Courts should deny motions to amend when the party seeking to amend is not able
to give an adequate justification for the delay:
Girard's inability to state an adequate reason for the untimeliness of the
motion discloses that this is not a case where "justice requires" an
amendment. On the other hand, the disadvantage defendants would face if
required to meet the new causes of action reveals that the interests of
justice will best be served by the court's denial of the motion to amend.
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
On the facts presented, we are not convinced that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to grant the requested leave to amend. An
amendment would certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full year earlier when plaintiff
discussed it in his deposition.
Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983).
Diehl's prejudice is palpable and significant.
required little preparation of Diehl.

Prior to the amendment, trial

Fairway had no evidence to support even a

prima facie claim of negligence or breach of warranty, a fact which Fairway conceded.
Mr. Baker: We have determined that we will not proceed with the
negligence counts. I think negligence, which we had alleged, were [sic]
based upon failure of Diehl and Colonial to supervise the installation and
we don't feel we have sufficient evidence to move forward on that so we
will withdraw that. With respect to the warranty, we don't have
sufficient evidence.
(Tr., October 13, 1987, 21).
With the amended complaint, Diehl was forced to prepare a defense in less than
four months.
Compounding the problem of preparing a defense in an expedited fashion was the
fact that the product in question had been manufactured eight years before.
Important witnesses, such as employees of Truss Teck and Colonial, had died or moved
away.

Important documents, such as the engineering design of Truswal for these

particular trusses, had been lost or discarded.
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Had Fairway's claims been raised in a timely manner, Diehl could have sought
indemnity from the manufacturer, Truss Teck.

Diehl chose not to seek indemnity from

Truss Teck on the negligence and warranty claims earlier for the same reason that
Diehl did not require much trial preparation before the amendment.

Fairway simply

did not have sufficient evidence to put on a prima facie case. After the amendment,
however, Truss Teck was protected from an indemnity claim by the statues of repose
contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25.5, 16-10-100 (1953), which state:
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal,
or for any injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to
real property, nor any action for damages sustained on account of such
injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such
improvement to real property more than seven years after the completion of
construction. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953).
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a
certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the
assets and business of the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by
expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away or impair any
remedy available to or against the corporation, its directors, officers,
or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon
is commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution. . . .
Utah code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1953).
It is true that ordinarily a cause of action for contribution or indemnity does
not accrue, and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until
the party seeking contribution or indemnity pays more than its fair share. But
these are statutes of repose, which run regardless of when the cause of action
accrues.

Annot., When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Claims For
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Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort, 57 ALR 3d 867 § 4[d] (1974).

Nevada

Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Elec, Inc., 511 P.2d 113, 115 (Nev. 1973); Agus v. Future
Chattanooga Dev. Corp., 358 F. Supp. 246, 251 (D. Term. 1973).

POINT II
UNDER UTAH LAW, ONLY "SELLERS" ARE STRICTLY LIABLE.
In the case of Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah
1979), this court adopted strict products liability as announced by the Restatement
of Torts (2d) § 402A, which states:
(1)
dangerous
liability
consumer,

One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
or to his property, if

(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rules stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The term "sale" is defined by the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-106 (1980), which states:
A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for
a price. . • .
That statute is part of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 2
deals with the sale of goods and includes many provisions dealing with the law of

warranty.

E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-313, 70A-2-314, 70A-2-315 (1980).

liability evolved from warranty law.
P.2d 152, 155-56 (Utah 1979).

Strict

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601

Because warranty law and strict liability are closely

related, it is entirely appropriate to apply the same definition of "sale" and
••seller" to both.
There is no evidence that Diehl sold the trusses in question.
that Diehl was not a seller.

The jury found

(R. 1375-1377, attached as Appen. E). That finding

should have resolved the issued of strict liability completely.

Utah law simply

does not impose strict products liability upon persons other than sellers.
Nor should the law of products liability be expanded to impose liability upon
those who are not sellers.

The assumptions and policies supporting imposing strict

liability upon manufacturers arguably do not apply when strict liability is applied
to sellers who are not manufacturers.

They clearly do not apply to the agents of

sellers, such as brokers and sales clerks.
The primary focus of strict products liability is the manufacturer, and there
appear to be three policy justifications for imposing strict liability upon
manufacturers:
1.

"Deep pocket1' or Mrisk spreading theory."

The costs of damaging events due

to defectively dangerous products are thought to best be borne by the enterprises
that make the products:
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves. . . .
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897, 901 (1962) (in bank); Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed.), pp. 692-93 (1984).
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A manufacturer, the theory goes, can best:

(1) absorb an occasional economic

loss; (2) raise the price of its goods to recoup a loss, thus spreading the cost to
many buyers, rather than one; or (3) spread the risk by purchasing insurance; which
will ultimately result in an increased price of the goods, thus, again, spreading
the loss to many buyers, rather than one.
Underlying the theory is an assumption about the relative wealth of the buyer
and the manufacturer.

The assumption is the manufacturer is a large corporation,

creating products in mass.

The buyer is powerless or at least at an economic

disadvantage.
On average, the assumption is probably correct.

In today's competitive market,

most products must be produced in large, highly technical and specialized plants
which achieve economies of scale.

Building and operating such plants requires large

amounts of capital.
The assumption, however, is not universally correct.

There are still small

manufacturers, cottage industries, and tradesman who create custom products.
products are necessarily custom made, such as these trusses.

Some

Some products must be

made totally in smaller plants because of transportation costs.

There are

manufacturers who cannot survive a disastrous experience with a particular product.
There are manufacturers who cannot afford insurance premiums.
The assumption concerning the economic disadvantage of the buyer is so strong
that the term "consumer'* is frequently used, or rather, misused.

The term

"consumer" implies an individual purchasing a product for home or family use.
as presently applied, strict liability is not limited to consumer buyers.

But

For

example, in the case of Ernest W, Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
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1979), the buyer was a corporation that operated a relatively large retail shopping
mall.

In the present case, the plaintiffs are business entities, rather than

"consumers."
Large manufacturers are themselves large buyers of other products. The state,
federal and local governments are large buyers of products.
Nor is the assumption that buyers are unable to bear the risk always correct.
Buyers too can insure against losses with property insurance, as in this case,
health, life, disability and business interruption insurance.

Many products cases

arise out of work-related injuries, for which workmen's compensation benefits are
available.
We do not require the plaintiff in a products action to prove the manufacturer
is actually better able to absorb or spread the risk.

For example, in this case we

have a large national insurance company that received a premium to assume the very
risk involved.

It seeks, by way of subrogation, to recover that loss from a small

to medium sized local corporation and its large national insurance carrier.
best able to bear or distribute the loss?

Who is

That was never addressed at the trial

level, and rightfully so. The law of strict liability does not ask who is best able
to handle the risk in each case. We are content to assume that the seller is best
able to handle the loss "on average."
2.

Promotion of accident prevention.

It is sometimes said that the cause of accident prevention can be promoted by
strict liability.

Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033,

1041-42 (1974); Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed.), p. 693 (1984).
Again, this policy is based upon an assumption.

We assume the manufacturer is

in the best position to have prevented the accident, if anyone was, and is in the
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best position to make changes to prevent future accidents.

The manufacturer

generally designs the product, selects the materials, shapes and assembles the
materials, selects components made by others, packages and labels the product and
provides written instructions.
than the buyer.

The manufacturer is assumed to have more expertise

The manufacturer tests the product, both during the development of

the product and after manufacture.

The manufacturer is generally familiar with

special concerns, conditions of use, and the regulatory requirements of government
entities.
The assumption is that the buyers have little or no ability to discover or
appreciate the defects in today's complex and technical products.

The consumer

cannot be expected to disassemble for inspection a car, television or home computer,
let alone understand the product enough to effectively inspect the product if it
were disassembled.
Again, the assumption, as applied to manufacturers, appears to be sound on
average, but not universally correct.

Some products are very simple.

Their defects

are as easily discernible to buyers as to manufacturers.

Some manufacturers are

unsophisticated.

Some products are custom

Some consumers are very sophisticated.

made to the buyer's design.
Moreover, even if the assumption were correct, there are some who would argue
that strict liability, as it is applied, may not induce greater care than liability
based on negligence.

See, Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability:

A

New Look at an Old "Defense,", 4 Ohio N.L. Rev. 249 (1977); Plant, Strict Liability
of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products - An Opposing View, 24
Term.L.Rev. 938 (1957).

If the manufacturer has done all that is reasonable and
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prudent, what more could the manufacturer have done to have prevented the accident?
If an accident discloses a defect in a product, which could not have been
anticipated or discovered through reasonable care earlier, then the manufacturer
will be liable under a theory of negligence if the manufacturer unreasonably fails
to take necessary steps to eliminate future accidents.

What contribution has strict

liability made to accident prevention in that situation?
3.

Difficulty of the buyer proving negligence.

Even if fault were the primary justification for imposing liability on a
manufacturer, such fault is often difficult for the buyer to prove.

Phipps v.

General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Prosser and Keeton on Torts
(5th ed.), p. 693 (1984).
Again, this policy is based upon an assumption.
manufacturers produce products in large numbers.

It is assumed that

A particular product is often made

in one of several different plants, widely geographically dispersed.

The

manufacturing process often involves many minute steps, each dependent upon those
that came before.

For each shift in the plant, each step or process is controlled

by a particular individual or group of individuals.
with little human intervention by machine.

Often the steps are performed

There may be three or four shifts each

day and many changes in personnel over time.

Even if the individuals responsible

could be isolated, how could they recall this one individual item, which they dealt
with briefly and mechanically, among hundreds of undistinguishable items.
The manufacturer, on the other hand, understands the process and can, if anyone
can, prove there was no negligence.
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Again, however, the assumptions are only sound M on average."
simple or produced in small numbers.

Many products are

There are many government and industry

standards which assist in evaluating a manufacturer's materials and procedures.
Evidence of negligence is often available from the product itself.

The doctrine of

res ipsa loguitur may be available in the negligence action.
The assumption is based upon the scenario of a manufacturing defect.
products cases involve claims of poor design.

Many

While a particular product is

replicated hundreds, thousands or perhaps millions of times, the design is common to
all of these identical products, and occurs but once.
drawings will te available.

For many products, design

Often there is no dispute about what the design was.

The dispute hinges on whether or not the design was adequate.

The dispute

concerning adequacy of design more likely will involve opinion testimony from
experts, rather than factual evidence.

This evidence is necessary to prove a

dangerous defect in the product under strict liability, whether the plaintiff must
also prove a standard of care and breach of that standard of care, or not.
A design case may require an analysis of risk versus utility, which is similar,
but not identical, to a negligence standard.

See, Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 20 Cal.

3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 457 (1978); Turner v. General Motors
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850-851 (Tex. 1979).

See also Prosser and Keeton on Torts

(5th ed.), pp. 699-700 (1984); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 Hofstra
L.Rev. 861 (1983); Davidson, The Uncertain Search for Design Defect Standard, 30
Amer.Univ.L.Rev. 643 (1981).
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If difficulty of proof is really the concern, is strict liability going too
far?

Would a rebuttable presumption of negligence and a shift of the burden of

proof solve the problem, without abolishing negligence principles entirely?
The policies of strict liability are not without flaws.

One of the goals is to

spread the risk, which by definition means an increase in the price of products.
But the price will be increased not only because of meritorious claims, but because
of those that lack merit.
Automobiles, for example, will always be involved in collisions.

It is

impossible to build a car that will prevent injury to its occupants in all
circumstances.

Even if it could be done, few buyers could afford such a car.

The

increased use of limited resources, and resulting weight, and resulting increased
fuel consumption and resulting increased pollution may not be viewed by all as a
completely positive result.
automobile?

But, what is the proper balance in the design of an

The question is often debatable and debated.

extraordinarily expensive to try.

And products cases can be

An automobile manufacturer, having won the battle

on the question as to whether a particular make and model of product was defectively
designed in some precise particular, may face exactly the same battle again and
again, as the outcome is not binding upon plaintiffs who are not party to the action.
Increased costs can, in some instances, be more than a minor inconvenience to be
passed along by the manufacturer to buyers.
disease.

Pertussis is a horrible, deadly

For reasons yet unknown, a very small, but predictable, fraction of a

percentage of children inoculated with Pertussis vaccine will develop an adverse
reaction ranging from fever, to brain damage to death.

The vaccine continues to be

used because health officials believe the risk of death from the disease is greater
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than the risk of adverse reaction.

Moreover, if everyone is inoculated, the disease

may be virtually, if not literally, eliminated, such as polio and small pox have
been.

Once the disease is eliminated, not only will the risk from the disease be

eliminated, but inoculation can be stopped and that risk eliminated as well.
states, for example, have laws which require Pertussis vaccination.

Many

E.g., Senn v.

Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (Ore. 1988) (en banc);
Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
In spite of the Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A, Comment k, vaccine
manufacturers face suits regularly.

The manufacturers claim that a major portion of

the cost of the vaccine today goes to pay defense and liability costs.

Intuitively,

we understand, and economists agree, that with many products, an increase in cost
may result in decreased demand.
choose to purchase it.

As a product becomes more expensive, fewer people

What of the child whose parents cannot or will not pay for

the vaccine because of the increased cost?
will compensate that child?

If that child contracts Pertussis, who

Where shall we spread that risk?

What of attempts to

eliminate the disease and the risk from both disease and vaccine?
Arguably, many products are safer today than just a few years ago.

Is it

possible that increased prices of new products encourage people to keep older, less
safe, products in use longer?
Will this increased risk spreading discourage competition from new, smaller
manufacturers who cannot absorb the losses, cannot afford insurance or have an
insufficient history in the industry to obtain insurance?
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Will some manufacturers simply stop making risky, but useful products?

See

Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
Will new, innovative and potentially useful products not be made because risks
are unknown?
While the primary focus of strict liability is the manufacturer, we extend
strict liability to other sellers as well.

The courts appear to have done so, with

little or no understanding that the assumptions which underlie the policy reasons
for strict liability become even less accurate when sellers who are not
manufacturers are considered.
The assumption that the seller is best able to absorb the loss becomes more
tenuous.

There is only one General Motors, but General Motors sells cars to

literally thousands of smaller independent dealers nationwide.

The manufacturer

that markets its products throughout the country or internationally usually must
market its products through many smaller wholesalers and retailers.
Arguably, the majority of this country's business enterprise is still small
business.

Many of these small businesses are involved in wholesaling and retailing

products.
The assumption that the seller is in the best position, if anyone, to prevent
accidents becomes tenuous when applied to sellers who are not manufacturers.

Some

intermediate sellers do cause or contribute to the defect, or fail to discover the
defect.

Some have the ability and basis to select safer products or better

manufacturers.

However, many more products are purchased and resold, unaltered by

intermediate sellers.

The nature of products make it just as impossible for an
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intermediate seller to inspect effectively as for the buyer.
expected to disassemble that T.V., stereo or automobile.

The dealer can't be

Packaging may make

effective inspection even more difficult for an intermediate seller than for the
buyer.
The assumption that proof is more difficult for the buyer is also tenuous.

Most

intermediate sellers are just as ignorant of the manufacturing process as the buyer.
And the flaws in the policy become more apparent when strict liability is
applied to sellers who are not manufacturers.
least one intermediate seller.
retailer.

Most products are marketed through at

Often there is a manufacturer, wholesaler and

Sometimes there is a component manufacturer, the product manufacturer

that purchases and incorporates the component part, a wholesaler, then retailers.
If each must bear the risk of loss, an increment of cost is added at each step.

If

each must purchase insurance, the price of the product to the ultimate buyer may be
increased not by one insurance premium, but by several premiums paid to several
insurers for the same risk.
Many of these intermediate sellers will be entitled to relief from the
manufacturer.

The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, may provide warranties, not

only to the ultimate buyer, but to intermediate sellers as well.
Ann, §§ 70A-2-313, 70A-2-314, 70A-2-315 (1980).

See, Utah Code

See also Utah Code Ann.

§ 70A-2-607(5) (1980); Restatement of Torts (2d) § 886B.

But, if this were

universally so, why allow a buyer to sue an intermediate seller that did not cause
the defect?
Attorney's fees, expert fees, etc. cannot be recovered by the intermediate
seller from the manufacturer, absent an agreement.
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Good plaintiff's lawyers know that an increase in the number of defendants
increases the value of nuisance suits.
Arguably, this is a wasteful and unnecessarily increase the final cost to the
buyer.
The justification for extending strict liability to intermediate sellers is that
it affords an alternative remedy when the manufacturer is insolvent.

That

justification appears to run counter to the assumption that manufacturers, on
average, are better able to bear the risks.

If that truly is the justification for

extending strict liability to sellers who are not manufacturers, why not require the
buyer to plead and prove that an intermediate seller contributed to, or failed to
discover, the defect, or that the manufacturer may not be able to respond in
damages?

If the concern is that the buyer may not be able to prove who caused the

defect in the product, why not reverse the burden of proof and give an intermediate
seller an affirmative defense that it did not contribute to or fail to discover the
defect, and the manufacturer is solvent or insured?
The assumptions underlying the policy of strict liability would become pure
guesswork if strict liability is expanded to the agents of sellers, such as brokers
and sales clerks. Who are these people?

How can they avoid accidents?

Can they

bear difficult burdens of proof better?
An agent for disclosed principal is ordinarily not liable under the contracts
the agent makes on behalf of the disclosed principal.

E.g.„ Restatement of Agency

(2d) § 302. The salesman at the car dealership makes no personal warranties as to
the car.

Should we divorce strict liability more from its origins in warranty law,

and make the salesman personally liable in strict liability?
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Should we make the real estate broker strictly liable for defects in the furnace
of a home that has been sold?
The trial court adopted a very, very expansive view of strict products liability:
The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as
well as all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable
for damages caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long
as that party is in the business of, and gains profit from, distributing
or otherwise disposing of the "product" in question through the stream of
commerce. The primary justification for extending strict liability to all
in the chain of distribution is to provide the "maximum" protection to the
consumer. This policy is as applicable to those who never handle or
control the product, as it is to those who do possess or control the
product. In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor
considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of the product is
not a prerequisite for the imposition of strict liability.
(Instruction No. 11, p. 1385.)
distribution" include?
mean?

What does "other parties in the chain of

What does "distributing or otherwise disposing of a product"

Should the jury really be instructed that they should forget the facts:

"consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered?"
If that is really all that strict liability is about, why shouldn't we impose
strict liability on the truck driver that made a wage delivering the trusses, the
estate of Herb the Colonial salesman that placed the order with Truss Teck, John
Mark Bangerter the general contractor who built the building and later sold it, the
carpenters that installed the trusses, the bank that provided construction
financing, the bank that provided financing to Fairway to purchase the building?
How about imposing liability on the insurance carrier that insured the property for
Fairway?

Undoubtedly, Fairway could not have obtained financing without assuring

the bank there was property insurance.

The insurance company was an indirect part

of facilitating the sale of these trusses.
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Perhaps they "otherwise disposed" of the

trusses.

And, unlike any of the others mentioned, that insurance company expressly

agreed to assume the risk we now seek to spread.
A forgotten lawyer once contently looked back on a long career at the bar and
said:
When I was a young lawyer, I lost a few cases I should have won. When I
was an old lawyer, I won a few cases I should have lost. On the whole,
justice was done.
That f s not a bad sentiment.

And justice "on the average" may be tremendously

more efficient.
Criminal prosecutors are charged, not with winning cases, but with doing
justice.

Most are sensitive to the damage to home, reputation and finances that an

unwarranted criminal charge can bring.

As a result, probably 90% of the criminal

cases brought result in conviction.
A large percentage of civil cases are settled.
civil cases with some merit.

There must be a large number of

Frankly, a plaintiff's lawyer does not stand to make

much income" from a case he does not at least subjectively believe to have some merit.
Why don't we say the plaintiff always wins, save the litigation costs and use
the dough to pay the homeless and hungry?

We could have some non-adversarial,

summary process to keep out the patently frivolous claims.

Justice will be done "on

average" and much more cheaply.
Such a process would be repugnant to a society that values the individual.
like the reminiscent old lawyer, we can only achieve justice on average, and can
only take some satisfaction in doing so, when we have done our best to achieve
justice in each and every case.
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And

When applied to manufacturers, strict liability appears to be justice

M

on

average."

Its policies and assumptions are not flawless, or sacrosanct, or beyond

critique.

But, it offers an improvement over the alternative negligence standard in

most cases.

Arguably, it is the best we can do to achieve justice in each

individual case.

Perhaps it is justified simply because it comports with a

consensus in our society that those who make dangerous products, even innocently,
should accept some responsibility for those products.
When strict liability is applied to sellers who are not manufacturers and who
did not create the product's flaw, arguably it is not even justice on average.

At

best, it is arguable whether an intermediate seller, when compared to the buyer, can
best absorb the loss, can best avoid accidents, or can best master difficult issues
of proof.

Arguably, absent some changes it is not the best we can do to achieve

justice in each individual case.

Perhaps it is justifiable because of the knowledge

that in many cases the loss will be passed by the intermediate seller to the
manufacturer who should bear the loss.

Perhaps, it is justifiable simply because of

some consensus that sellers who are in the business of selling products should take
some responsibility for dangerous defects in those products.

If there is such a

consensus it is not as complete, nor as strong, as the consensus regarding
manufacturers.
When we seek to expand strict liability to those who are not sellers, the
assumptions and policies of strict liability do not apply.

There is no consensus.

It does not approach justice "on the average," but rather, is an arbitrary
reassignment of wealth.
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POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT DIEHL MBROKEREDM THE TRUSSES IN
QUESTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A jury's finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
unsupported by substantial admissible evidence:
The question on appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict is not
whether there is substantial evidence which would have supported a
contrary verdict, or even whether this Court, had it been trier of fact,
would have reached the same verdict as that reached by the jury. Rather,
the issue is whether the jury's findings are supported by substantial
competent evidence.
In re Estate of Kessler, 702 P.2d 86, 95 (Utah 1985).
Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's findings, the
jury's finding that Diehl brokered the trusses in question is not supported by
substantial admissible evidence.
The court defined a broker as follows:
Definition of broker: an agent employed to make bargains and contracts
for compensation. A middleman or negotiator between parties. A person
whose business it is to bring buyer and seller together. Buyers and
sellers of goods and negotiators between buyers and sellers, but without
having custody of the property.
(Instruction No. 21, R. 1359; Tr. 456).
At trial, Fairway called a principal of Colonial Lumber, Rodney W. Gibson.
115-116).

(Tr.

Mr. Gibson identified documents which evidenced the sale of the trusses

in question by Colonial to Bangerter.

(Tr. 121-134).

Gibson testified that he had seen similar documents from Truss Teck to
Colonial.

Colonial frequently received work orders from Truss Teck.

1979 frequently purchased trusses from Truss Teck.

-34-

Colonial in

When that was done, the billing

came through Diehl Lumber, even though the order was placed directly by a Colonial
salesman to Truss Teck.

The procedure was to call Truss Teck directly, not Diehl,

and reach an agreement directly with Truss Teck.
to "Herb" under the heading of "salesman."

(Tr. 153-159).

The exhibit refers

Gibson identified Herb as a salesman for

Colonial that frequently placed orders for trusses.

(Tr. 127-128, 172).

Gibson was then asked about his knowledge of brokering in general.
160-165).

(Tr.

Gibson testified that if a broker was involved, the broker would be

called for a price.

The broker negotiated the price.

would be made with the broker.

Any arrangements for shipping

In contrast, when Colonial purchased trusses in 1979

from Truss Teck, they ordered trusses from Truss Teck directly.
contact Diehl.

They did not

It was Truss Teck, not Diehl, that negotiated prices.

Teck, not Diehl, that made arrangements for shipping.

It was Truss

(Tr. 167-169).

Gibson was asked about a hearsay, hand-written, notation on a Diehl invoice to
Colonial which stated that trusses were replaced or repaired "at Diehl." Gibson
testified that he had no personal knowledge of where the trusses were repaired or
replaced.

He believes they would have been taken back to the manufacturer.

The

reason the invoice was referenced to Diehl, was that the billing came from Diehl.
(Tr, 165-166),

(See also Tr. 170-171).

Gibson could not say whether, in 1979, Diehl ever called upon Colonial to try
and sell trusses.

(Tr. 172).

Fairway also called the former president of Truss Teck, Gary Diehl.
291-292).

(Tr.

He testified that Truss Teck was started in 1978, the year before these

trusses were made.

(Tr. 295).

Gary Diehl testified that orders were placed directly with Truss Teck.
302-307).
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(Tr.

Gary Diehl testified that in 1979, Truss Teck had its own sales staff and did
its own marketing of trusses.

Truss Teck sold trusses directly to their customer.

Diehlfs only role in the sale of trusses was to bill accounts receivable.
deducted five percent from the gross sales price.

Diehl

The reason Diehl was asked to

perform the billing function was that Truss Teck did not have its own computer or
accounting staff.

(Tr. 310-312, 318-320, 326). Gary Diehl testified that sometime

after 1979, Truss Teck acquired its own computer and performed its own billing.
(Tr. 325). Gary Diehl testified that during the period that he operated Truss Teck,
he did not recall a situation where customers were sent to Truss Teck by Diehl.
(Tr. 325). He testified that there was no brokerage relationship with Diehl.

(Tr.

327-328).
Fairway then called Bruce Hiller, the chief financial officer of Diehl Lumber.
(Tr. 328-329).
Mr. Hiller was asked whether Diehl was involved in brokering roof trusses. His
response was that it depends on how the term "brokerage" is defined.

(Tr. 314).

The Court asked Mr. Hiller to define the manner in which he used the term, but he
was not given a chance by counsel.

(Tr. 335).

Counsel again returned to the question, "did Diehl broker roof trusses in
1979." Again, Mr. Hiller asked for definition of the term "broker."
335-336).

(Tr.

The court again suggested that Hiller be allowed to define the term

"broker," again, to no avail:
THE COURT: I think he must be allowed to answer what he means by the term
or he can't answer your question.
Question. (By Mr. Katsaros) Mr. Hiller, when Diehl Lumber sells roof
trusses, do they try to earn a profit or percentage of the gross sale on
that truss?
(Tr. 336).
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Having been successful at ignoring several requests by counsel, the witness and
the court for a definition of the term "broker," counsel returned to the question
whether Diehl brokered trusses. Mr. Hiller testified that in 1979, with regard to
the sale of any trusses, Diehl performed the accounting, but did not get involved in
the sale itself.

(Tr. 336).

Mr. Hiller was then asked to read from his deposition:
To the best of my knowledge we were a broker of trusses. In 1979 if an
order for trusses was called from a customer it would have had to have
gone to another company such as one who manufactured trusses. That
company would deliver them. We would broker trusses for a company and do
the billing and sometimes ship trusses in our trucks with other materials
as a convenience and take a broker commission only, but we did not take
orders for trusses in 1979.
Q.
So if someone called you, say Colonial Lumber called and wanted to
buy some trusses from Diehl Lumber, was it a procedure that you would then
refer them to another company?
A.

We would refer them to the manufacturer.

Q.

In this instance, who were you brokering trusses for in 1979?

A.

Primarily, Truss Teck, Inc.

Q.
You say primarily. Do you know of any trusses that were purchased
from any other company or brokered from any other company except Truss
Teck.
A.

We may have.

I don't recall.

Q.

You don't have any personal knowledge?

A.

No.

Q.

But, you were definitely brokering from Truss Teck?

A.

Yes.

(Tr. 339-340).
Finally, Mr. Hiller was given a definition of the term "broker." He made it
clear that in 1979, orders for trusses were taken by Truss Teck, not Diehl. Diehl
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did not actively pursue truss buyers, but did perform a bookkeeping function.

He

also made it clear that he "would use the term broker very loosely as a general
term."

Customers who called wanting trusses were referred to Truss Teck only as a

matter of courtesy.

(Tr. 345-352).

The only thing supporting the jury's finding that Diehl brokered trusses was Mr.
Hiller's confusion over the term and his use, or more appropriately his misuse, of
the term in a very general sense, rather than in the manner in which it was defined
by the court.
Moreover, the only evidence concerning what happened with these very trusses is
the documentary evidence which indicates Truss Teck filled out a work order
describing the trusses in question as having been ordered by Herb of Colonial
Lumber.

The trusses were picked up by Colonial.

generated by Diehl to Colonial.

Sometime later, an invoice was

That invoice did not contain any mark-up in price.

Colonial then sent its invoice to its customer, Bangerter, this time with a mark-up
to reflect the fact that Colonial had purchased and resold trusses in question.
The testimony was uncontroverted that Truss Teck took its own orders. Colonial
would place orders directly with Truss Teck.
and delivered or picked up.

The trusses would then be manufactured

Diehl would then generate an invoice and perform the

billing for Truss Teck.
Even the confused testimony of Mr. Hiller makes it clear that Diehl did not take
orders for trusses in 1979. Customers wanting trusses would be referred to someone
else as a matter of courtesy.
It is true that a jury verdict should not be disturbed if it is supported by
substantial admissible evidence.

The jury's finding that Diehl brokered the trusses
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in this case is supported by nothing more than confusion over the definition of a
legal term, not evidence.

POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IRRELEVANT AND
PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE OF DIEHL'S WEALTH AND ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO GIVE A CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION.
Over Diehl's objection, Fairway was allowed to put on evidence concerning
Diehl's wealth.

(Tr. 330-331).

This evidence was not even calculated to be

relevant, and should have been excluded.

U. R. Evid. 402.

Not only was the evidence irrelevant and inadmissible, it was prejudicial.
E.g., Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981).

In that case, the Wyoming

Supreme Court held that it was not only prejudicial error to introduce evidence of a
defendant's wealth in a case where only compensatory damages were involved, it was
reversible error to introduce evidence of a defendant's wealth in a case where
punitive damages were claimed, if the evidence was introduced before the jury
returned a finding that punitive damages were appropriate.
It is a good guess that rich men do not fair well before juries, and the
more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fair . . . .
Id. at 1128 (quoting Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1191
(1931).
It is impossible to say that the jury's verdict of compensatory damages
was not effected by its knowledge that Schlumberger had a deep pocket and
that the award would be satisfied from that pocket.
Id. at 1132.
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When defendant asked for an instruction to reduce the prejudice, the trial court
refused.

(Tr. 453).

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IRRELEVANT AND
PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE UNPLED THEORY OF
"SUCCESSOR LIABILITY/' AND ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE A
CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION.
A corporation which purchases assets from a product manufacturer is generally
not liable for injuries caused by products manufactured by the selling company prior
to the purchase transaction.
general rule of nonliability.

Some courts have recognized four exceptions to this
The purchaser may be liable where:

(1) the successor

assumes the selling company's liabilities; (2) the transaction constitutes a merger
or consolidation; (3) the successor is a mere continuation of the selling company;
or (4) the transaction was a fraudulent attempt to avoid liability.

E.g., Florum v.

Elliott Mfr. Co., 629 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Colo. 1986); Prosser and Keeton on Torts
(5th ed.) p. 707 (Supp. 1988).
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Ray v. Alad Corp. , 19 Cal. 3d 22,
136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977), created an additional exception, called the
"product line" theory.

Most courts have rejected it.

Prosser and Keeton on Torts

(5th ed.) p. 707 (Supp. 1988); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach. , Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515
(S.D. 1986); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985).
Diehl first learned that Fairway intended to claim that Diehl was liable for the
acts of Truss Teck under a theory of successor liability when Diehl received
Fairway's proposed jury instructions.

The claim of successor liability was not

stated in either the Amended Complaint or the Pre-trial Order.
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Diehl filed a written objection to the case being tried on a successor liability
theory.

(R. 1198-1204).

The objection was in effect a motion in limine.

Despite Diehlfs objection, Fairway was allowed to introduce a great deal of
evidence under the guise of "successor liability/1 which was really calculated to
support Fairway's unstated theory of guilt by association.

(Tr. 291-302, 309,

314-321, 324-325, 331-332, 353-354).
The trial court granted Diehl's motion for directed verdict on the issue of
successor liability.

(Tr. 364-368).

However, the court refused to give an

instruction requested by Diehl which would have reduced some of the risks that the
jury's verdict would be based on guilt by association.

POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DIEHL'S CONTRIBUTION
AND INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS AGAINST TRUSWAL.
In 1983, the Utah Legislature enacted a series of statutes which provided for
contribution among joint tortfeasors.

1973 Utah Laws, Ch. 209, §§ 3-7; former Utah

Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38 through 78-27-43.

In 1986, the Legislature abolished joint

and several liability and repealed these provisions.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38

through 78-27-43 (1953); 1986 Utah Laws, Ch. 199, §§ 2-7.
In the case of Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987), this court
addressed the issue of the application of the new act to accidents which occurred
before the effective date of the act.

This court held that the new act did not

apply retroactively to cases which arose from accidents which occurred before the
effective date of the statute.
Truswal answered Fairway's complaint and raised a cross-claim against Diehl.
(R. 123-131).

Diehl responded and counterclaimed against Truswal, seeking

-41-

contribution or indemnification.

(R. 153-157),

Under the Stephens decision, the

old statute applies to those claims.
Under the old statute, a settling joint tortfeasor could not resolve a claim for
contribution by settling with the plaintiff and obtaining a release, unless the
release provided that any judgment recovered from the remaining joint tortfeasors
was diminished by the greater of the settling party's pro rata share of fault or the
amount paid by the settling tortfeasor:
(1) A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor does not
relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint
tort-feasor unless that release:
(a) is given before the right of the other tort-feasor to secure a
money judgment for contribution has accrued; and
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro-rata share of
the released tort-feasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable
against all the other tort-feasors.
(2) This section shall apply only if the issue of proportionate fault is
litigated between joint tort-feasors in the same action.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43; 1973 Utah Laws, Ch. 209, § 7.
At final pre-trial on October 13, approximately fourteen days before trial,
Fairway mentioned that they had settled with Truswal. Diehl made it clear that it
had a contribution claim and expected to have any judgment against it reduced by the
greater of the amount of Truswal's fault or the amount paid by Truswal in
settlement, and expected to have Truswalfs fault determined at trial.

In the

alternative, Diehl expected to have Truswal at trial or have a fault judgment if
Truswal failed to show.

(Tr., October 13, 1987, 22-27).

A dispute arose between Truswal and Fairway regarding whether or not the release
would settle contribution claims.

(R. 1053-1061, 1122, 1135, 1142-1197).
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The court

failed to resolve the issue before trial.
5-11, 14-15).

(Tr., October 27, 1987, 3, 15-38; Tr.

Despite the lack of a resolution of the issue regarding the form of

the release, Truswal was excused from trial.

(Tr. 5-8).

The confusion over whether or not Diehl had a contribution claim against Truswal
lingered throughout the trial.

(Tr. 233-247).

The court erred in dismissing Truswal without first determining whether or not
Truswal had obtained a release which comported with the statute.
The issue of Truswal's fault was ultimately submitted to the jury, but the
confusion prevented a full and fair trial on that issue.

POINT VII
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT TRUSWAL WAS NOT AT FAULT FOR THE
DEFECTS IN THE TRUSSES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL,
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
The jury's finding that Truswal was not at fault for the defects in the trusses
is the product of confusion, and is not supported by substantial, admissible
evidence.
Rodney Gibson, who was called by Fairway, testified that after Colonial had
received a request by a customer for trusses, they contacted truss manufacturers to
receive bids. Truss Teck was one of those manufacturers.
If the price was acceptable to Colonial's customer, the truss manufacturer would
submit truss engineering drawings to be approved by Colonial's customer.
156-157, 432-34).
Teck.

(Tr.

Gibson testified that Colonial did a lot of business with Truss

He does not recall not receiving design drawings from Truss Teck.

name was stamped on those engineering drawings.
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Truswal's

(Tr. 441). He further testified

that ordinarily contractors will not purchase trusses without stamped drawings.
(Tr. 442).
Gary Diehl testified that Truss Teck did not employ any engineers.

(Tr. 298).

When Truss Teck's customers called to order trusses, the customer gave Truss Teck
the building dimensions and some design information.
for engineering.

Truss Teck then called Truswal

Truss Teck stocked plates purchased from Truswal.

In return for

purchasing the plates, Truss Teck was entitled to receive Truswal's engineering free
of charge.

Truss Teck used Truswal designs exclusively in 1979.

312-314, 321-322).

The trusses were delivered with Truss Teck's work order, and a

copy of the design drawing.
design work.

(Tr. 303-308,

(Tr. 326). Truss Teck never attempted to do its own

(Tr. 313-314).

Fairway called Arnold Coon, a consulting engineer, as an expert witness.
174).

(Tr.

Mr. Coon testified that he was familiar with Truswal. He testified that

Truswal made barbed truss plates and furnished computer designs, depicting the size
thickness of plates and the type of lumber, to truss manufactures.
standard practice in the industry.

That was the

(Tr. 212-216, 220). He testified of his own

personal knowledge that the plates in question were manufactured by Truswal.
214).

(Tr.

He testified that it was not likely that Truswal plates were used with

someone else's design.

That would be inconsistent with industry standards.

(Tr.

215).
Mr. Coon testified that a manufacturing defect, the misplacement of plates,
contributed to the problem.

However, he admitted that the collapse would still have

occurred even with correct placement.

(Tr. 219).
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Diehl called Vance T. Christensen, a consulting engineer, as an expert witness.
(Tr. 369-376).

He also testified that there was a design defect and the trusses

would have collapsed even without a misplacement of plates.

(Tr. 393).

Mr. Christensen testified that truss plate manufacturers, such as Truswal and
others, design trusses and send design drawings to fabricators for review.
Fabricators do not ordinarily engineer trusses.
which is supplied free when plates are purchased.
practice.

Fabricators use the engineering
That is a standard industry

Even consulting engineers such as himself and Mr. Coon rely on plate

companies1 engineering.

(Tr. 394-395).

He testified that plate designers should be

responsible for any reasonably foreseeable construction errors.

Plate size is a

primary concern and it is the plate manufacturers which specify the size.
Fabricators follow that specification.

(Tr. 402-405).

He testified that it would

be very unusual for a truss manufacturer to deviate from the plate required by the
suppliers design.

(Tr. 411-412).

Despite uncontroverted evidence that:

(1) the trusses in question were

defective; (2) the major defect was a design error; (3) the design error was of
sufficient magnitude to have caused the collapse, even without any manufacturing
error; (4) the plates in question were Truswal plates; (5) Truss Teck manufactured
the trusses; (6) Truss Teck used only Truswal plates; (7) Truss Teck used only
Truswal designs; and (8) it would have been highly unusual, given the standard in
the industry, for Truss Teck to have used anything other than the Truswal design,
the jury found that Truswal was not at fault.
should be reversed.
admissible evidence.

The jury's finding in that regard

It is not supported by any evidence, let alone substantial
It is the product of confusion and conjecture.
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CONCLUSION
The trial erred in allowing Fairway to assert a strict liability claim.

That

error was contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and an abuse of discretion.
Since that strict liability claim was the only claim before the district court at
trial, the judgment against Diehl should be reversed, and the trial court should be
directed to enter an order dismissing Fairway's claim against Diehl with prejudice.
The jury correctly found that Diehl was not a seller of the trusses in question
within the meaning of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (2d). The court
erred as a matter of law in entering judgment against Diehl.

Judgment against Diehl

should be reversed, and the trial court should be directed to enter an order
dismissing Fairway's claims against Diehl with prejudice.
The jury's finding that Diehl "brokered" the trusses in question is not
supported by substantial, admissible evidence.

Again, the judgment should be

reversed, with instructions to the trial court to enter an order of dismissal.
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed Fairway to introduce
evidence of the wealth of Diehl over Diehl's objection.

The trial court compounded

the error by refusing to give a corrective instruction.

At a minimum, the judgment

should be reversed for a new trial.
Similarly, the district committed prejudicial error when it allowed Fairway to
introduce irrelevant and prejudicial evidence under the guise that it supported a
claim of "successor liability."

That evidence was nothing more than an attempt to

produce a jury verdict from guilt by association.

The trial court compounded the

error by refusing to give a corrective jury instruction.
against Diehl should be reversed for a new trial.
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At a minimum, judgment

The trial court committed prejudicial error when it dismissed Diehl's
contribution and indemnification claims against Truswal.
Truswal's fault weighed by the jury.

Diehl was entitled to have

Instead, the procedure adopted by the district

court resulted in prejudicial confusion.

At a minimum, the judgment against Diehl

should be reversed for a new trial to determine Truswal's fault.
The jury's finding that Truswal was not at fault for the collapse in question is
not supported by substantial, admissible evidence.

At a minimum, judgment against

Diehl should be reversed for a new
iew trial
trj. on that issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this !>

day of

, 1988.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN

By
SfiSrdfT:. D r a n e y ^
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
D i e h l Lumber Comizfany
SCMSED407
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FILED IN C'.tRK-i OrFICF
DAVIS CO'JNi'Y.iJTAH

1397 NOV - 2 AH & <»6
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT |^:-jW©G?pJBF!!;H.CLEPK
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UT^t VlJ'*'t'' CCURT
nv

V ^ N

LLiUTY CL:.:";K

FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING,
Plaintiff,

vs.
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al,
Defendant.

)

SPECIAL VERDICT

>

Civil N o . 37017

]

Members of the jury:
This is a special verdict form containing several questions,
each of which must be answered by you in accordance with the
Court's instructions and the following comments. Each question
must be answered with the word "Yes" or "No." You can answer
"Yes" only if there is a preponderance of the evidence concerning
the question. In the event you find the evidence preponderates
against the question presented, then you must answer it "No."
An agreement of six jurors (not eight jurors) is required to
answer each question, and when any six jurors agree upon an
answer, you should have the Chair write in the answer and then
proceed to the next question as appropriate.
When you have answered all of the questions required, the
Chair should then sign and date this special verdict and return
it to the courtroom.
WE, THE JURY IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED ACTION, for our special
verdict, answer the questions submitted as follows:
Question 1:
Was Colonial Lumber, Inc. a seller of the
trusses in this case to John Mark Bangerter?
Answer:
^^
(Yes or No)
Questions 2:
Was Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. only a
bookkeeper for Truss Tek Inc. for the truss sale involved in this
case?

FILMED

Answer:

^^
(Yes or No)
Question 3:
Was Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. a broker
between Colonial Lumber, Inc. and Truss Tek Inc. for the truss
sale involved in this case?
Answer:
Yes or No)
Question 4:
Did Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. sell the
trusses in this case to Colonial Lumber, Inc.?
Answer:
^
(Yes or Ntf)
Question 5: Were the trusses in question dangerously and
unreasonably defective at the time they were delivered to John
Mark Bangerter?
Answer:
(Yes or No)
Question 6: Was any unreasonably dangerous defect in the
trusses a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages?
Answer: J^
(Yes or No)
Question 7: What amount of money will fairly and adequately
compensate the plaintiffs for the damages they reasonably
sustained as a result of the accident in question?

$

i S. o° c >*°

Question 8: Considering the fault, if any, of each
participant
in
the
design,
manufacture,
delivery,
and
construction of the trusses in this case, weigh the contribution
to plaintiffs' damages of each. Your answer should be stated in
terms of percentages and should add up to 100%
Fault of Truswal Systems, Inc.
0
%
Fault of Truss Tek Inc.
&Q
%
Fault of Diehl Lumber Products, Inc.
5
%

Fault of Colonial Lumber, Inc.
Fault of John Mark Bangerter
TOTAL
Dated October 30, 1987.

<D

Q

CHAIR

%
100%

" L E ? ' I N I J L E R K ' S OFFICf

DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH

mm-k

AMD39

MICHACL G At.LPiCN.CLEUK
2MO DlSIhlCT COURT

MERLIN O. BAKER of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

BY
etrUi f CLtfvh

PETER M. KATSAROS
CLAUSEN, MILLER, GORMAN,
CAFFREY & WITOUS, P.C.
10 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Telephone: (312) 855-1010
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO.;
FAIRWAY LIMITED, a partnership,

:

Plaintiffs,
:

JUDGMENT

v.
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;
JOHN MARK BANGERTER; BONNEVILLE
ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL
SYSTEMS, INC.; COLONIAL LUMBER,
INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY,

:
:

Defendants.
:
JOHN MARK BANGERTER,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT ENTERED

Civil No. 37017

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of
Reading Pennsylvania; CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, TRUCK
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP,
Third-Party
Defendants•

:
:

:
ooOoo

This action came on for trial before the Court and a Jury,
the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, District Judge, presiding, and the
issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly answered
Special Interrogatories and rendered its verdict on October 30,
1987, and having awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs,
Fairway Distributing Co. and Fairway Limited, and against the
defendants, Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. and Colonial Lumber, Inc.
in the amount of $75,000.00, and the defendants being entitled to
a credit of $6,500.00, the amount of settlement proceeds paid by
Truswal Systems, Inc. to plaintiffs, and the Court having
determined that the plaintiffs are entitled to pre-judgment
interest on the balance of $68,500.00 at the statutory rate of 10%
per annum from March 5, 1984 to the date of the entry of judgment
in the amount of $26,543.00.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiffs,
Fairway Distributing Co. and Fairway Limited, have judgment
against the defendants, Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. and Colonial
Lumber, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of $95,043.00,
and plaintiffs' costs of this action.
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DATED this

</

day of Januory, 1988.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

^\

day of January, 1988, a

true and correct copy of JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Shawn E. Draney, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Bonneville Engineering, Inc.
and Diehl Lumber Company
Norman O. Fox, Esq.
686 West 3100 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Colonial Lumber, Inc.
David S. Cook, Esq.
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Defendants Bangerter
Construction Co. and John Mark
Bangerter
Phillip S. Ferguson, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Truswal Systems, Inc.
Don J. Hanson, Esq.
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
Truck Insurance Exchange and
Farmers Insurance Group
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Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Gary L. Diehl
Michael J. Cooper, Esq,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
American Casualty Company and
CNA Insurance Companies
Bruce R. Garner, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
American Casualty Company and
CNA Insurance Companies

0487b
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant/Appellant this 5th day of July, 1988, by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Merlin 0. Baker, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
James T. Ferrini, Richard P. Winter
and Edward T. Kay of the firm
CLAUSEN, MILLER, GORMAN, CAFFREY &
WITOUS, P.C.
10 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, Ste. 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Norman 0. Fox, Esq.
686 West 3100 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010

David S. Cook, Esq.
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Michael J. Cooper, Esq.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Phillip S. Ferguson, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Don J. Hanson, Esq.
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Suite 1300 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah/ 84101

Draney
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